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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This matter is on appeal from a judgment of conviction upon a jury's 
verdict finding Thomas Zachary Alec Paulk guilty of forcible sexual penetration 
by use of a foreign object. Paulk argues the district court abused its discretion 
by allowing an out-of-court statement by the victim into evidence. Paulk also 
contends the statement's admission violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation. Finally, Paulk argues the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion to reduce that 
sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Thomas Zachary Alec Paulk with forcible sexual 
penetration by use of a foreign object. 1 (R., pp. 23-24.) The victim is L.B., the 
then-two year-old daughter of Paulk's girlfriend at the time, Nicole Orme. (PSI, 
p. 2.) Paulk and Orme lived together with Orme's two daughters from a prior 
marriage - L.B. and then-five year-old K.B. - and also Paulk and Orme's son, 
M.P., who was then nine months old. (9/13/11 Tr., p. 239, L. 15 - p. 240, L. 5; 
PSI, p. 14.) 
1 Paulk was also charged with, and found guilty of, lewd and lascivious conduct; 
this conviction was later dismissed pursuant to the state's motion based on the 
psychosexual evaluation which showed Paulk acted with intent to injure the child, 
but not with sexual intent, when he forcefully thrust his finger into the child's 
vagina. (R., pp. 121-22, 124.) 
1 
On the evening at issue, Orme left Paulk with the children, and went to 
pick up dinner. (PSI, p. 2; 9/13/11 Tr. p. 241, L. 19 - p. 242, L. 1.) Sometime 
after Orme left, Paulk became frustrated while changing L.B.'s diaper and 
inflicted a serious injury to L.B.'s vaginal area. (PSI, p. 2.) Paulk called Orme, 
telling her to come home because L.B. was bleeding. (PSI, p. 2; Tr., p. 242, L. 7 
- p. 243, L. 23.) Orme returned home, and after seeing L.B.'s injury, brought her 
to the Mountain View Hospital Ready Care.2 (PSI, p. 2; State's Exhibit 6.) The 
intake staff-person, Melissa Boyce,3 asked L.B., "Did you get an owie?"; L.B. 
responded, "Zackie did it, to me." (9/7/11 Tr., p. 206, Ls. 12-13.) 
The doctor sent L.B. into surgery at the Eastern Idaho Regional Medical 
Center (EIRMC), and notified police. (PSI, p. 2.) Law enforcement interviewed 
Orme at the EIRMC, and went to interview Paulk at home. (PSI, p. 2; State's 
Exhibit 7.) Paulk's initial story conflicted with Orme's; when confronted with this, 
Paulk admitted his lie, and said he had hurt L.B. on accident when his knee 
buckled due to a recent surgery. (PSI, p. 2.) 
Officers found semen on the bed near a blood stain where Paulk said he 
had changed L.B.'s diaper. (PSI, p. 2.) When asked about it, Paulk disclosed 
that he had masturbated in the bathroom earlier, and probably wiped his hand on 
the bed. (PSI, p. 2.) Police arrested Paulk. (PSI, p. 2.) Upon arrest, Paulk 
admitted that he had gotten frustrated with L.B. crying about her bottom hurting, 
2 State's Exhibit 6 shows the spelling Mountain View Hospital "Redicare"; 
however the facility is spelled "Ready Care" throughout the record. 
3 Boyce happened to be L.B. 's aunt through Orme's previous marriage, but 
testified that she did not know L.B. well. (9/7/11 Tr., p. 201, Ls. 15-24; 9/13/11 
Tr., p. 296, Ls. 7-8.) 
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so he put his finger inside her and pushed down hard, causing the injury. (PSI, 
p. 2.) 
The state moved for a pre-trial determination on the admissibility of L.B.'s 
statement to Melissa Boyce at the hospital. (R., p. 58.) After a hearing at which 
the district court took testimony and heard arguments (see 9/7/11 Tr.), the court 
granted the state's motion (R., pp. 60-62). 
At the conclusion of trial, a jury found Paulk guilty of forcible sexual 
penetration by a foreign object. (R., pp. 80-81.) The district court sentenced 
Paulk to a term of 15 years with five years fixed. (R., pp. 131-32.) Paulk filed a 
Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence (Supp. R., p. 11), which the district court 
denied (Supp. R., p. 28). Paulk timely appeals. (R., pp. 93-100; Supp. R., pp. 
30-33.) 
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ISSUES 
Thomas Zachary Alec Paulk states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted an 
out-of-court statement by the victim based on its conclusion 
that the statement was both an excited utterance and a 
statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment? 
2. Even assuming that the out-of-court statement of the victim 
was not inadmissible hearsay, did the district court violate 
Mr. Paulk's rights under the Sixth Amendment's 
Confrontation Clause when it admitted the statement over 
his objection? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, 
following Mr. Paulk's conviction for forcible sexual 
penetration with a foreign object? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Paulk's Rule 35 motion in light of the new information 
provided, namely, that, since he was sentenced he has been 
the victim of threats and physical attack due to the nature of 
his conviction? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Paulk failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting the victim's out-of-court statement because the record and 
applicable law support the district court's reasonable determination that 
exceptions to hearsay applied? 
2. Do the record and case law support that Paulk's right to confrontation was 
not violated, or that any violation of his right to confrontation was harmless 
error? 
3. Has Paulk failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
sentencing him to 15 years with five years fixed for forcible sexual 
penetration with a foreign object? 
4. Has Paulk failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his Rule 35 motion based on evidence he has been threatened and a 
suggestion he might not receive tailored treatment? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Paulk Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting 
The Victim's Out-Of-Court Statement Because The Record And Applicable Law 
Support The District Court's Reasonable Determination That Exceptions To 
Hearsay Applied 
A. Introduction 
Paulk argues the district court abused its discretion in admitting L.B.'s 
hearsay statement to hospital staff. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-14.) According to 
Paulk, Idaho law does not support that L.B.'s statements fell within the excited 
utterance or medical diagnosis exceptions on which the district court's ruling was 
based. Paulk's argument misapplies Idaho law. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's decision whether to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. State v. Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729,731,240 P.3d 575,577 (2010) 
(citation omitted). For this analysis, the appellate court considers whether the 
district court: (1) understood the issue was discretionary; (2) acted within its 
scope of discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards; and (3) made 
its decision through exercise of reason. lg_,_ at 732, 240 P.3d at 578. 
C. Excited Utterance Exception Applied 
Generally, hearsay - statements not made by a declarant testifying at 
trial, and made to prove the truth of the matter asserted - are inadmissible in 
court. I.RE. 801 (c), 802. However, Rule 803(2) authorizes the admission of 
hearsay that is an "excited utterance," or a statement "relating to a startling event 
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... made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event." I.R.E. 803(2). 
For this exception to apply, the trial court must find: (1) an occurrence 
"sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought 
processes of an observer"; and (2) that the statement was "a spontaneous 
reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought." 
State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 4, 730 P.2d 921, 924 (1986) (quoting E. Cleary, 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 297 (3d ed. 1984)); State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 
507, 516-17, 927 P.2d 897, 906-07 (Ct. App. 1996). Where the evidence 
sufficiently supports these "foundational requisites," admission of the excited 
utterance "is left to the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Bingham, 116 
Idaho 415, 421, 776 P.2d 424, 430 (1989). 
In exercising its discretion, the trial court "reviews the totality of the 
circumstances, including the nature of the startling event and the demeanor of 
the declarant when making the statement." Kay, 129 Idaho at 517, 927 P.2d at 
907. This includes consideration of the declarant's age, and whether the 
statement was self-serving. & 
Arguing that the excited utterance exception does not apply, Paulk 
highlights that L.B. was not crying. (Appellant's brief, p. 13.) This argument is 
unavailing, given Idaho case law. In State v. Kay, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
considered an out-of-court statement by a four year-old victim of sex abuse, 
hours after the alleged abuse. 129 Idaho 507, 927 P.2d 897. The Kay court 
found the declarant child's calm exterior did not render the excited utterance 
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exception inapplicable. kl at 517, 927 P.2d at 907. Rather, the trial court 
properly found the child's behavior - curling up next to and hanging onto her 
mother - was evidence she was "bottling up" emotions, as the Idaho Supreme 
Court discussed in State v. Parker, 112 Idaho at 4, 730 P.2d at 924. Kay, 129 
Idaho at 517, 927 P.2d at 907. 
In Parker, the court considered an out-of-court statement by a 14 year-old 
rape victim. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 730 P.2d 921. The court noted that "[i]n sex 
crimes, the excited utterance exception often receives broader application," and 
the "tendency to admit such statements, even when made hours after the event, 
probably lies in their high probative value." kl at 4, 730 P.2d at 924. The court 
concluded the victim's statement, recorded two to three hours after the alleged 
rape, satisfied the excited utterance exception. kl In Parker, as in Kay, the 
court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court below. Parker, 112 Idaho at 
4, 730 P.2d at 924; Kay, 129 Idaho at 517, 927 P.2d at 907. 
Paulk also cites the time lapse from the startling event to the time of L.B.'s 
statement. (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.) As already mentioned, in both Parker 
and Kay, hours had passed between the declarants' sexual assault and 
statement. Parker, 112 Idaho at 4, 730 P.2d at 924; Kay, 129 Idaho at 517, 927 
P.2d at 907. Thus, the timing here - less than two hours between L.B.'s assault 
and statement, does not support abuse of discretion by the trial court in applying 
the excited utterance exception. 
Examining the circumstances here, L.B.'s age militates against her 
statements being the result of reflective thought. The record shows that L.B., 
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like in Kay, exhibited signs of bottling up, in that she was clinging to her mother 
and wanting to sit in her lap, where L.B. would normally be running around, 
playing. (9/7/11 Tr., p. 192, Ls. 5-9.) Notably, there is no evidence Melissa 
Boyce prompted L.B. to identify a perpetrator, or that she otherwise prompted 
L.B.'s statement; she simply asked, "Did you get an owie?" (9/7/11 Tr., p. 206, 
Ls. 12-13.) Given Idaho case law, the totality of circumstances supports that the 
excited utterance exception applied. Paulk has thus failed to show the district 
court abused its discretion in admitting L.B.'s statement under this exception. 
D. Exception For Statements Made For Medical Diagnosis Or Treatment 
Applies 
Rule 803(4) allows the admission of hearsay statements made "for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." I.R.E 803(4). Under the explicit 
language of the rule, a proponent of the evidence offered must show: (1) that 
the statements were "made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment"; (2) 
that the statements described "medical history, or past or present symptoms, 
pain, or sensations, or the source thereof'; and (3) that the statements were 
"reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." I.R.E. 803(4); Kay, 129 Idaho 
at 518, 927 P.2d at 908. 
In considering whether this exception applies, the court must look to the 
totality of the circumstances, including: the child's age; whether the child 
generally understood the medical provider's role; whether the child was in pain or 
distress; any undue influence, such as leading questions; whether the child 
understood the need to be truthful to the medical provider; whether there was an 
ongoing custody dispute; the child's ability and willingness to communicate; the 
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child's ability to differentiate between truth and fantasy; and whether the 
examination was conducted for purposes of litigation rather than treatment. Kay, 
129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908. 
Considering the factors identified in Kay, the circumstances here support 
that L.B.'s statement falls within the exception. There was no custody dispute 
clouding L.B.'s motivation; at the time of the examination, L.B.'s mother was 
entirely supportive of Paulk. (9/13/11 Tr., p. 255, L. 21 - p. 256, L. 1.) The 
record supports that L.B. was experiencing pain and discomfort, given the extent 
of the injury and her need for surgery to repair the damage to her vagina. 
(9/13/11 Tr., p. 253, Ls. 19-20; p. 254, Ls. 2-14 (L.B. cried during doctor's exam, 
after Melissa Boyce's intake exam); p. 361, Ls. 9-21 (extent of injury required 
surgery).) There is nothing in the record to support that L.B. did not understand 
why she was at the hospital, or that she was confused as to truth or fantasy. 
In State v. Nelson, a 10 year-old victim of sexual assault was taken to the 
emergency room within an hour of her assault; the defendant sought to exclude 
her examination, arguing it was "for purposes of discovering evidence to 
corroborate her allegations of sexual abuse." 131 Idaho 210, 216, 953 P.2d 650, 
656 (Ct. App. 1998). The court in Nelson found the medical treatment exception 
applied, stating, "On this record there is no basis to infer that the declarant ... 
believed she was seeing the doctor for any reason other than diagnosis and 
treatment." !9..:. Here, there is even less reason to believe L.B.'s examination by 
Melissa Boyce was anything other than for diagnosis and treatment, as there 
was no allegation of abuse when that intake examination began. 
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In arguing abuse of discretion, Paulk claims the district court erroneously 
concluded that "the motivation of the questioner is the key in determining 
whether 803(4) is satisfied." (Appellant's brief, p. 11.) The motivation of the 
questioner is pertinent as to the purpose of the exam. Nelson, 131 Idaho at 216, 
953 P.2d at 656. Here, the record reveals the district court's findings were not 
limited to this inquiry; the district court addressed that the child was experiencing 
pain, and noted the lack of evidence to suggest her statement was self-serving. 
(9/7/11 Tr., p. 229, Ls. 11-16; p. 230, Ls. 14-17.) Given the district court's 
thorough evaluation of the facts before it, Paulk has failed to show an abuse of 
discretion in finding the medical diagnosis exception applied. However, as 
discussed in the next section, the state also asserts that any error by the district 
court was harmless. 
11. 
The Record And Case Law Support That Paulk's Right To Confrontation 
Was Not Violated, Or That Any Violation Of His Right To Confrontation Was 
Harmless Error 
A. Introduction 
Paulk contends his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated 
when the district court allowed into evidence L.B.'s statement to hospital staff. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 14-21.) Again, Paulk misapplies applicable law. Further, 
even if this Court finds the Confrontation Clause was violated, the district court's 
error was harmless. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
When a party asserts a constitutional violation, the court on appeal will 
defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State 
v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 372, 247 P.3d 582, 599 (2010) (citation omitted). 
The appellate court exercises free review over the question whether 
constitutional requirements were satisfied, given those factual findings. Id. 
Here, whether the admission of L.B.'s statements violated Paulk's Sixth 
Amendment right to confront a witness is a legal question over which the Court 
exercises free review. Id. 
C. Paulk's Right To Confrontation Was Not Violated Because L.B.'s 
Statement Was Not Testimonial 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is implicated where a 
witness's statement is testimonial in nature, the witness is unavailable for trial, 
and the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). Given L.B.'s very young age, 
the sole issue here is whether L.B.'s statement to Melissa Boyce was 
testimonial. To determine whether a disputed statement was testimonial, the 
court considers the purpose of the questioner who elicited the challenged 
statement. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 373, 247 P.3d at 600 (citing State v. 
Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143-44, 176 P.3d 911, 915-16 (2007)). The court also 
considers the formality of the questioning. 1.9.:. (citing Hooper 145 Idaho at 144-
45, 176 P.3d at 916-17). 
In Shackelford, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the statement in 
question was not testimonial where the purpose of the interrogation that elicited 
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the statement was not "to establish or prove past events," but to show demeanor. 
150 Idaho at 373, 247 P.3d at 600. In another case, the Idaho Supreme Court 
found that evidence was testimonial and thus in violation of the Confrontation 
Clause where "the primary purpose of the interview was to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, as opposed to 
meeting the child's medical needs." Hooper, 145 Idaho at 145-46, 176 P .3d at 
917-18. The court noted that the interviewer did not inquire about the child's 
medical condition. kL. at 146, 176 P.3d at 918. 
Here, the purpose of Melissa Boyce's question (and L.B.'s response) was 
not to establish or prove past events, but to meet L.B.'s medical needs; as intake 
staff, Boyce's role was to gather information to assist the doctor or provider in 
starting treatment. (9/7/11 Tr., p. 203, L. 25 - p. 204, L. 9; p. 206, Ls. 23-25; p. 
207, Ls. 10-11; p. 208, Ls. 1-5.) The fact that intake staff are also mandatory 
reporters of child abuse does not eclipse the purpose of the intake staff's initial 
assessment. (9/7/11 Tr., p. 212, L. 19- p. 213, L. 12.) Boyce's responses to 
counsel's inquiry on that point are more demonstrative of rigorous cross-
examination than of confusion over the initial assessment's purpose. Given the 
evidence regarding the purpose of L.B.'s initial assessment, L.B.'s statement 
was non-testimonial, and thus did not violate Paulk's right to confrontation. 
D. Even If The Court Finds That The Confrontation Clause Was Violated, 
Admission Of L.B.'s Statement Was Harmless Error 
The court in Hooper considered whether admission of testimonial 
statements in violation of the Confrontation Clause was harmless error. An 
appellate court can find a constitutional error harmless on determination "beyond 
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a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the 
admission of the challenged evidence." Hooper, 145 Idaho at 146, 176 P.3d at 
918. In that case, the court noted that the "child's testimony was essential" and 
that "much of the physical evidence was inconclusive." !9..:, The court thus 
concluded that the trial court's error in admitting the statements was harmless. 
In this case, the evidence against Paulk was staggering. The doctor who 
observed and treated L.B. at the Ready Care, and then who performed L.B.'s 
surgery after she was transferred to EIRMC, was Jonathan Kent McGregor, D.O. 
(9/14/11 Tr., p. 339, Ls. 14-15; p. 349, Ls. 1-24; p. 350, Ls. 4-11, 17-21; p. 371, 
Ls. 10-12.) Photographs that Dr. McGregor took of L.B.'s injuries, as well as a 
photograph taken post-surgery, were admitted as Exhibits 8 - 11. (9/14/11 Tr., 
p. 351, L. 22 - p. 352, L. 1; p. 417, L. 20.) 
About L.B.'s injuries, Dr. McGregor testified, 
... this type of injury is absolutely indicative of a penetrating 
trauma for the fact that there was no injury to any of the 
surrounding structures, and the injury extended so far up into the 
vagina that there was nothing but a penetration that could have 
caused that kind of extension into the vagina. And just from the 
tearing, something had to be penetrated with a lot of force. There 
had to be quite an exertion of force placed on whatever was 
penetrated into the vagina. 
(9/14/11 Tr., p. 364, Ls. 15-24.) As to the possibility of an accident, Dr. 
McGregor also testified, 
[M]y opinion is that there's no way it could be accidental, because 
from a fall or something like that ... you would have injuries in the 
surrounding tissues around the buttocks, the legs .... [W]hen you 
have an accidental trauma, before there's any injury to the vagina 
itself, there is going to be injury to the surrounding structures. 
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(9/14/11 Tr., p. 365, Ls. 4-16.) When asked if he had observed any injuries, 
bruises, cuts, or anything to L.B.'s legs, buttocks or vulva, the doctor responded, 
"no," "none." (9/14/11 Tr., p. 359, Ls. 10-21.) "There was no bruising, no 
scratches[,] no nothing on the surrounding structures in that area." (9/14/11 Tr., 
p. 368, Ls. 9-10.) 
Five year-old K.B., L.B.'s sister, testified that she was at home when L.B. 
was injured. (9/13/11 Tr., p. 303, Ls. 1-8.) K.B. testified that on that night, she, 
L.B., Zack (Paulk), and her brother M.P. (less than a year old) were home; her 
mother (Orme) had gone to get food when L.B. was hurt. (9/13/11 Tr., p. 303, L. 
13 - p. 304, L. 20.) Orme's testimony corroborated that, when L.B. suffered her 
injury, only Paulk and the children were home. (9/13/11 Tr., p. 241, L. 10 - p. 
242, L. 14.) 
Detective Patrick McKenna, who had conducted much of the investigation 
in this incident, testified that Paulk changed his story many times during his 
interview. (9/15/11 Tr., p. 509, L. 18 - p. 510, L. 12; p. 511, L. 21 - p. 512, L. 3; 
p. 512, Ls. 18-22; p. 513, L. 5 - p. 514, L. 1; p. 515, L. 14 - p. 516, L. 7.) This 
included the final version, that Paulk had intentionally put his finger in L.B.'s 
vagina and pushed down hard, causing the damage. (9/15/11 Tr., p. 525, L. 24 
- p. 526, L. 2.) 
Officer Leendert VanHulten was also part of the team that investigated the 
incident; his testimony corroborated Detective McKenna's, that Paulk's story 
changed a number of times. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 462, L. 1-16; p. 462, L. 24 - p. 463, 
L. 5; p. 463, Ls. 12-17; p. 463, L. 20 - p. 464, L. 1.) This was also corroborated 
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by Officer Kyle Christopherson. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 479, L. 3 - p. 480, L. 2.) Officer 
Christopherson testified he heard Paulk say he was upset because L.B. was 
crying but wouldn't tell him what hurt, "so he began pushing her down on the 
bed[, a]nd his fingers were going inside of her" out of anger. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 481, 
Ls. 7-12.) Officer Christopherson then heard Paulk say, "I'm fucked." (9/14/11 
Tr., p. 481, L. 14.) 
Addressing Paulk's statement to police, the prosecution asked Dr. 
McGregor if L.B.'s injury was consistent with accidental penetration caused by a 
knee buckling when changing L.B.'s diaper. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 368, Ls. 12-16.) Dr. 
McGregor's opinion was that such an explanation was illogical: 
[l]f your knee buckles, to catch yourself ... you are not going to do 
this .... that's not how I catch myself when I'm falling down. So 
that kind of scenario does not make any sense to me with this kind 
of trauma, no. 
(9/14/11 Tr., p. 368, Ls. 19-25.) 
As to a scenario where L.B. was sliding off the bed during a diaper 
change (9/14/11 Tr., p. 369, Ls. 1-8), Dr. McGregor also testified that the injury 
could not have been caused by L.B. falling off and being pushed back up: 
[T]he injury would not have been sustained from that kind of fall. 
The amount of weight from a little two-year old would not put 
enough force on catching that child to be able to create this 
extensive of an injury. It's just not possible. 
(9/14/11 Tr., p. 369, Ls. 10-15.) 
Finally, the prosecution asked Dr. McGregor if L.B.'s injury could have 
been caused by one putting fingers inside her vagina and pushing down out of 
anger because the child was whining and crying during a diaper change. 
(9/14/11 Tr., p. 369, Ls. 16-20.) Dr. McGregor responded: 
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He'd have to push pretty hard, but yeah, I mean that kind of 
scenario, a purposeful penetration of the vagina could cause this 
injury, sure. Doesn't seem like a logical way to discipline a two-
year old that's crying, but it's possible. 
(9/14/11 Tr., p. 369, Ls. 21-25.) 
A pediatric forensic nurse, Tara Demkowicz, RN, who is trained as a 
sexual assault nurse examiner, also observed L.B. at EIRMC, and testified at 
trial. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 399, L. 12 - p. 401, L. 6; p. 402, Ls. 9-15; p. 414, Ls. 13-
24.) Her opinions about the hypothetical causes of L.B.'s injury concurred with 
those of Dr. McGregor: 
• An accidental fall is unlikely given the lack of injury to external or outer 
vagina, or other parts of L.B.'s body. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 425, Ls. 10-23; p. 
429, Ls. 3-13.) 
• A knee buckling while changing L.B.'s diaper is not possible given the 
severity of the damage. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 429, L. 14 - p. 430, L. 10.) 
• L.B. sliding off the bed during a diaper change is not possible because 
her injury was to the anterior rather than posterior aspect; in other 
words, the injury was not consistent with lifting up, but with pushing 
down. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 430, L. 11 - p. 431, L. 4.) Also, the injury 
would not have been so great. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 431, Ls. 5-8.) 
• Penetration by a finger "with extreme force and repetitiveness" is 
possible. (9/14/11 Tr., p. 426, Ls. 22-25.) 
Dr. Karen Hansen, a pediatrician and professor of pediatrics, testified she 
was contacted to give an opinion on what had happened to L.B. (9/15/11 Tr., p. 
559, Ls. 15-23.) From information initially presented to her by Orme, Dr. Hansen 
had "concerns that an accident could have been misinterpreted as sexual abuse" 
because of how upset people can become about this type of injury. (9/15/11 Tr., 
p. 561, Ls. 9-12.) But after reviewing the medical record, Dr. Hansen's opinion 
was consistent with those of Dr. McGregor and RN Demkowicz. (9/15/11 Tr., p. 
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572, L. 9 - p. 573, L. 25 (knee buckling and sliding off changing area unlikely; 
consistent with intentional act out of anger or frustration).) 
In sum, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury's finding that 
Paulk was guilty of forcible sexual penetration. More damning than the two year-
old L.B.'s statement at issue here, was Paulk's ultimate admission to law 
enforcement that he inflicted the injury out of frustration and anger. Given 
Paulk's admission and the extensive, unbiased, credible testimony of medical 
professionals and law enforcement, a jury would have reached the same verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt, even without L.B.'s statement. Accordingly, any 
violation of Paulk's Sixth Amendment right was harmless. 
111. 
Paulk Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Sentencing Him To 15 Years With Five Years Fixed For Forcible Sexual 
Penetration With A Foreign Object 
Paulk argues that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him 
to a term of 15 years with five fixed. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-25.) The appellate 
court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits absent a showing 
the court clearly abused its discretion. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 
253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). To carry his burden, an appellant 
must show his sentence is excessive "under any reasonable view of the facts," 
considering the objectives of criminal punishment: protection of society, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution or punishment. Windom, 150 Idaho at 
876, 253 P.3d at 313. In reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate 
court independently reviews the record, examining the nature of the offense, and 
the offender's character. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132, 267 P.3d 709, 
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719 (2011) (citation omitted). Where reasonable minds could differ as to 
whether a sentence is excessive, the appellate court will not disturb it. State v. 
Miller, 151 Idaho 828,834,264 P.3d 935,941 (2011) (citation omitted). 
The parties presented no witnesses at Paulk's sentencing, only argument. 
In addition to counsels' arguments, the Court considered, among other evidence, 
the PSI report, Paulk's psychosexual evaluation, and letters from Paulk's family, 
and also heard from Paulk. (See 4/9/12 Tr.) Of particular concern to the court 
was Paulk's characterization of the crime as "a complete accident." (4/9/12 Tr., 
p. 28, Ls. 2; p. 31, L. 23 - p. 32, L. 4.) The crime "was a violent act and a willful 
act, willful in the sense that it was done out of anger, and it wasn't an accident. 
It's a tragedy but, again, accident connotates that there wasn't intent, and there 
was." (4/9/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 1-4.) 
The district court acknowledged the continuing support of Paulk's parents 
(4/9/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 20-23), Paulk's neurological issues (4/9/12 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 6-
18), and Paulk's substance abuse issues (4/9/12 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 18-21). Also, the 
court expressed its belief "that the act was much more aggressive than you are 
acknowledging and with much more intent to commit the act," noting that it is the 
act, and not the result, on which the court's attention is focused. (4/9/12 Tr., p. 
34,Ls.9-13.) 
The court specifically identified and commented on the four objectives of 
punishment: wrongdoing, rehabilitation, protection of society, and deterrence. 
(4/9/12 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 15-19; p. 35, Ls. 2-22; p. 36, L. 3 - p. 37, L. 16.) The court 
explained with great care and thoughtfulness, the considerations before it, and 
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how the facts of this case applied. (Id.) These considerations included the harm 
toward a very young child, that there were not substantial grounds to justify the 
criminal conduct, and that the victim was injured through no fault of her own. 
(4/9/12 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 3-8, 25; p. 37, Ls. 5-6.) 
Given all the information before it, the court found the sentence of 15 
years with five years fixed appropriate. (4/9/12 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 1-3.) As to Paulk's 
argument that sending him to prison will make him a criminal, the court said, 
"Just as you had the ability on that day to make a choice as to whether or not to 
harm that child, you will have countless other opportunities and choices 
throughout your incarceration as to whether or not you chose to be rehabilitated 
or, in your words, become the criminal that you're concerned about by this 
sentence." (4/9/12 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 5-11.) 
Given the egregious nature of the crime, Paulk simply cannot show that 
the district court's view of the facts was unreasonable, on consideration of the 
objectives of criminal punishment. See Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 253 P.3d at 
313. Importantly, the record shows the district court considered, and did not 
ignore, the various mitigating factors presented by Paulk, re-raised on this 
appeal. (See 4/9/12 Tr.) Even where another reasonable interpretation of the 
facts exists, at odds with the district court's, Paulk's sentence must not be 
disturbed on appeal. Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941. Accordingly, this 
Court must reject Paulk's argument. 
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IV. 
Paulk Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying 
Paulk's Rule 35 Motion Based On Evidence He Has Been Threatened And A 
Suggestion He Might Not Receive Tailored Treatment 
Paulk also asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his Rule 35 Motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) In reviewing a district court's 
denial of a Rule 35 motion, the appellate court applies an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008). Again, 
for such review, the appellate court considers whether the district court (1) was 
aware its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the scope of its discretion 
and consistent with applicable law, and (3) reached its decision through exercise 
of reason. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011 ). 
Paulk argues that the district court failed to adequately consider new 
information presented at the hearing on his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 25-27.) That information included that Paulk was threatened with physical 
harm once incarcerated at the Department of Corrections in Boise, because of 
the nature of his crime. (9/10/12 Tr., p. 5, L. 22 - p. 6, L. 3.) Also, Paulk's 
counsel informed the district court that Paulk would not receive neurological 
counseling - recommended by the psychosexual evaluator - to address 
violence. (9/10/12 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 6-10.) Rather, defense counsel asserted the 
available treatment would be that geared toward sex offenders. (9/10/12 Tr., p. 
11, Ls. 11-19.) The state responded that there was no evidence the Department 
of Corrections would not fashion an appropriate treatment. (9/10/12 Tr., p. 22, 
Ls. 1-7.) 
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Paulk's psychosexual evaluator determined that Paulk did not commit his 
crime for purposes of sexual gratification. (9/10/12 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 18-19.) Paulk 
thus argued incarceration was inappropriate, because it would result in Paulk 
receiving treatment he does not need, and not receiving treatment he does need. 
(9/10/12 Tr., p. 11, L. 17 - p. 12, L. 3.) A sentence of supervised probation, 
Paulk argued, was instead appropriate. (9/10/12 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 4-12.) On 
appeal, Paulk makes no additional argument, but only reiterates what was raised 
at hearing on his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) 
Paulk essentially argues he should receive a punishment best-tailored to 
his needs, and not one that might result in Paulk receiving less-than-optimal 
treatment. At hearing, Paulk invited the district court to ignore completely the 
extensive injury and on-going harm inflicted upon a two year-old victim with 
whose care he was entrusted; to ignore retribution; and to take an enormous 
leap of faith with regard to protecting society and deterring future crime, all in the 
name of possible rehabilitation. The district court declined to accept that 
invitation, noting that Paulk's act was "done out of anger," and, despite the 
evaluator's opinion that it was not done for sexual gratification, it was "inserti[on 
of] a foreign object into the vagina of a child forcibly and violently ... it was 
graphic, it was injurious, and it was appalling," thus it was "a deviant sexual act." 
(9/10/12Tr., p. 29, Ls. 7-14.) 
At hearing, the district court reiterated the four objectives of punishment, 
highlighting the question of how much to weigh rehabilitation and deterrence. 
(9/10/12 Tr., p. 31, Ls. 10-16.) Citing Paulk's evaluation report, the district court 
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found that Paulk was "at high risk of violent recidivism in the future." (9/10/12 
Tr., p. 31, Ls. 17-21.) The district court noted that it had considered Paulk's 
state of mind on the day of the event, and "[v]ery carefully went through, if not all, 
many of the [probation considerations]." (9/10/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 11-14.) 
Specifically acknowledging the new facts before it, the district court found that a 
reduced sentence would not fulfill "an appropriate amount of punishment, 
deterrence, protection of society and rehabilitation." (9/10/12 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 18-
25.) Finally, the district court noted that Paulk's sentence is "significantly less 
than what's available under the statute. It's less than what the state asked for, 
and I believe it is a fair sentence that accounts for those very things that the 
defense argues today." (9/10/12 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 2-6.) 
Given the district court's careful and thoughtful consideration of the facts 
and arguments of counsel, there is simply no basis to find it abused its discretion 
in denying Paulk's Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's 
judgment of conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 21st day of March, 2013. 
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